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DIRECTOR

SECTION ONE OF THREE.

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO WALT ROSTOW, WHITE HOUSE,

FROM AMBASSADOR LOCKE.

(TEXT CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE)

C/S COMMENT: DISSEMINATION RESTRICTED. TEXT DIRECTED TO ANOTHER
U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION.

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C02954843

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TIME!

DATE: 24 NOVEMBER 1967

FROM: SAIGON

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RECEIVED 2409582 IN 99377

TO: DIRECTOR REF: CAP-67973

THE FOLLOWING IS A REVIEW OF AVAILABLE DOCUMENTATION

THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN, COALITION GOVERNMENT,

NEGOTIATIONS, AND FRONT'S NEW PROGRAM. IT IS CLEAR THAT

MUCH OF WHAT THE ENEMY DIRECTS IN THE DOCUMENTS CITED IS

FAR BEYOND HIS REALISTIC CAPABILITIES. WE ARE UNDERTAKING A

TUDY WHICH WILL EVALUATE THIS MATERIAL IN THE LIGHT OF

CURRENT AND RECENT ENEMY MILITARY ACTION AND OTHER PERTINENT

EVIDENCE. THIS STUDY WILL BE FORWARDED WITHIN TWO WEEKS.

DOCUMENTS, PRISONER INTERROGATIONS AND OFFICIAL STATEMENTS BY VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST LEADERS, IT APPEARS THAT COMMUNIST STRATEGY TOWARD VIETNAM WAR IS IN STATE OF FLUX. IT IS TOO EARLY, HOWEVER, TO DETERMINE WITH PRECISION WHAT IS IN TRAIN. OVER PAST THREE MONTHS, NUMBER OF IMPORTANT THEMES HAVE EMERGED. THE MOST IMMEDIATE, ALTHOUGH NOT FIRST, IS WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN NOW BEING CONDUCTED BY VIET CONG (VC). THIS CAMPAIGN



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IS BEING DESCRIBED AS THE DECISIVE PHASE OF WAR, AND JUDGING FROM BATTLES OF LOC NINH AND DAK TO, VC SEEM TO BE MAKING ALL OUT EFFORT, REGARDLESS OF LOSSES, TO INFLICT A DEFEAT ON ALLIED FORCES. AT SAME TIME, VC HAVE BEGUN TO STRESS FORMATION OF COALITION GOVERNMENT. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS ARE REPLETE WITH SUCH REFERENCES, AND NEW PROGRAM OF THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM (NFLSV) WAS, INTER ALIA, A CALL FOR OTHER GROUPS TO JOIN WITH FRONT IN OPPOSING GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN). FINALLY, UNLIKE THE SITUATION PREVAILING, UNTIL AUGUST 1967, POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS IS NOT BEING HENTIONED OR IF IT IS, IT IS IN VERY HARD LINE CONTEXT. THE

S. ACCORDING TO CAPTURED DOCUMENTS VC WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN,
(DEGINEING OCTOBER 1967) IS BEING EXPLAINED AS "DECISIVE,
EISTORICAL" STAGE OF REVOLUTION WHICH WILL BRING ABOUT MAJOR
"TURNING POINT" IN WAR AND WHICH WILL DECIDE ITS ULTIMATE
OUT COME. VC CITE SITUATION AS BEING VERY FAVORABLE TO THEM
SECAUSE NILITARILY ALLIES ARE BOGGED DOWN IN STRATEGICALLY.

FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS WILL BRIEFLY SUMMARIZE DATA WE HAVE ON

480V2 THEMES AND CITE THE MAJOR REFERENCES.

JIPTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN




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PAGE THREE SAIGON THOUGH ROT TACTICALLY, DEFENSIVE POSTURE. "IN ADDITION, UNITED STATEM IS INCREASINGLY ISOLATED INTERNATIONALLY AND TOKN BY DISSENSION INTERNALLY. THESE FACTORS PLUS IMPENDING 1953 ELECTIONS APPARENTLY LEAD VC TO BELIEVE THAT CURRENT U.S. ADDINISTRATION WILL WANT TO END WAR BEFORE FALL OF 1958.

VC ALSO SEE ADVANTAGES FOR THEMSELVES IN SITUATION PREVAILING IN SOUTH VIETNAM (SUN). THEY VIEW CURRENT GVN AS CORRUPT, DEPOPULAR AND INCAPABLE OF GAINING ALLEGIANCE OF BULK OF IN EFFECT, VC TAKE HOPE FROM APPARENT DIVISIVE POPULATION. FACTORS WITHIN GVN. ESPECIALLY LATERT REVALRY BETWEEN THISU AND RY, AND EXISTENCE OF VARIOUS ANTI-GOVERNMENT CHOUPS SUCH AS ACCUTANT BUDDHISTS AND DISAPPOINTED DANDIDATES LEFT IN WAKE OF SEPTEMBER ELECTIONS. FROM THIS AMALGAM OF DISPARATE GROUPS. VC APPARENTLY EXPECT TO SEE AND INCREASING AMOUNT OF DISSENSION AND TURMOIL IN SOUTH VIETNAMESE SOCIETY WHICH THEY CAN EXPLOIT. IF NOT LEAD. IN COUNTRYSIDE, VC HAVE ASSIDIOUSLY DIRECTED ACTIVITIES TO DISRUPT REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROCRAM, AND APPARENTLY BELIEVE THAT GUN ARMED FORCES ARE SUFFERING FROM SERIOUS MORALE PRODLEMS AND ARE INCAPABLE OF ADVANCING OR PROTECTING THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM.

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PAGE FOUR SALGON

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POSSESS BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL INITIATIVE AND ARE IN VERY FAVORABLE POSITION FOR BRINGING WAR TO A VICTORIDUS CONCLUSION DURING 1968. THE STATED OBJECTIVES OF THIS CAMPAIGN INCLUDE:

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- A. DEFEAT OF MAJOR PORTION OF BOTH U.S. AND GVM MILITARY FORCES;
- B. DESTRUCTION OF GVN'S ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS IN COUNTRYSIDE, THEREBY ENABLING VC TO GAIN CONTROL OF ALMOST ALL OF RURAL POPULATION;
- C. INSTIGATION OF POLITICAL TURNOIL AND DENOMSTRATIONS
 IN CITIES, WHICH WILL CULMINATE IN "GENERAL UPRISING" RESULTING
 IN OVERTHROW OF PRESENT GVN;
- P. FORMATION OF COALITION GOVERNMENT BETWEEN VC AND OTHER GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS NOT AFFILIATED WITH NELSY.
 - U. VC GOALS ARE TO BE ACHIEVED THROUGH COORDINATED AND SOUP

WIDE POLITICAL ANDM BULLARY OFFENSIVE UTILIZING ALL VO ASSETS.

THEREE-PRONGED" OFFENSIVE, NAMELY MILITARY PRESSURE, POLITICAL ASTRATION, AND MILITARY PROSELYTING. TO THIS END, VO MAIN

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TOWIED ARE TO ATTACK HAJOR ALLIED UNITS AND TO FOLCE THE RECEPLIFIED OF ALLIED TROOPS FROM HEAVILY POPULATED AREAS INTO HISTERIANDS. THERE, VC HOPE TO KEEP ALLIES TIES DOIN IN STATE. DEFINITIVE POSITIONS. THEY ANTICIPATE THAT THIS WILL ALLOU VO TANKS THE ASILIFY TO SETAIR JUCK MEEDED RICE AND OTHER SUPPLIES FROM THESE AREAS. AT THE SAME TIME, HEAVY CASUALTIES ARE TO BE IMPLICITED. TO DECIALLY ON AMERICAN UNITS, AND SOME LANGE ALLIED COMBAT FORMATIONS, BATTALION TO BRIGADE SIZE, ARE SUPPOSED TO BE COLLETELY DESTROYED.

- 7. TELSEWHERE, OTHER VC MAIN FORCES CONSIDED WITH LOCAL FORCES ARE TO ATTEMPT TO EXPAND LIBERATED AREAS BY LAUVOHERG CONTINUOUS ATTEMPTS ON PACIFICIATION TEAMS, LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL, LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND REAR BASES. REFUGEES ARE 10 SE URBENT TO ATTEMPT TO FORMER HOMES IN VC AREAS AND AT LEAST 75 PERSENT OF CURRENT SVN-CONTROLLED AREAS ARE TO SE "LIBERATED."
- 8. IN URBAN AREAS SPECIAL ACTION UNITS ARE TO IRUNCE IN WIDESPREAD TERRORISM AND SABOTAGE; IN MUL. MAJOR OFFICE IN MEYN.
 THESE ACTIVITIES ARE TO BELCOORDINGTED WITH MILLITARY ATTACKS
 ON THE CITIES: FROM WITHOUT AND THE INSTIGATION OF POLITICAL



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TURNOIL IN THE UNSAN AREAS.

Q. FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS CONTAIN BEST INFORMATION CURRENTLY AVAILABLE CONCERNING NEWLY INITIATED VC WINTER-

"COEC LOG NO. 13-1698-67

CDEC LOG NO. 13-2255-67

CDEC LOG NO. 12-2338-67

CDEC LOG NO. 13-1558-67

CDEC LOG NO. 12-1282-67

CDEC LOG NO. 11-1289-67

CDEC LOG NO. 11-1353-67

CDEC LOG NO. 11-1375-67

CDEC LOG NO. 10-1811-67

CDEC LOG NO. 11-1236-67 4R-

CDEC LOG NO. 11-1531-67

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COALITION GOVERNMENT

13. 1966 RESOLUTION OF COSVN CLAO DONG 12TH RESOLUTION)

CONTAINED REFERENCES TO NEED TO INTENSIFY THE FRONT FOR

WATIONAL UNITY AND CALLED FOR STRUGGLE TO DENAND THE WITHDRAWAL OF

ARERICAN TROOPS, TO OVERTHROW THE LACKEY REGIME, AND TO ESTABLISH

A NATIONAL DENGRATIC COALITION GOVERNMENT. AS EARLY AS

GOTOBER 1965 THERE WERE REPORTS OF INTEREST IN REVIVING DEMOCRATIC

PARTY IN ANTICIPATION OF GENGRAL ATTACK AND GENERAL REVOLT, THEN

SCHEDULED FOR EARLY 1967, WHICH WOULD RESULT IN FORMATION OF

A COALITION GOVERNMENT IN LIBERATED PROVINCES. INDOCTRINATION

COURSES FOR NVA PERSONNEL ON THE 12TH RESOLUTION DISCUSSED

OPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR COALITION GOVERNMENT IN EVENT THAT

VC DID NOT WIN COMPLETE VICTORY, I.E., VICTORY WHICH WOULD MEAN

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OUTRIGHT VC CONTROL AND SOCIALIZATION OF SVN. THE COALITION

GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, WOULD BE CONSIDERED A "DECISIVE" VICTORY,

I.E., SOMETHING LESS THAN A COMPLETE VICTORY.

- ON 26 MAY 1967, EXPLAINED THAT THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY
 HAD ABANDONED THE IDEA OF ESTABLISHING A "RESISTANCE" GOVERNMENT
 AND HAD TURNED ITS ATTENTION TO "COALITION" GOVERNMENT, WHICH
 WOULD DEPEND TO LARGE EXTENT ON COOPERATION OF SYMPATHETIC
 INDIVIDUALS OUTSIDE OF NFLSV. BA TRA STATED THAT REFERENCES
 TO COALITION GOVERNMENT IN 1966 RESOLUTION OF COSUN HAD BEEN
 DISSEMINATED ONLY FROM PROVINCE COMMITTEE UP AND WERE NOT
 MENTIONED AT LOWER LEVELS, LEST IT REDUCE THE CADRES' FIGHTING
 SPIRIT. HE EXPLAINED THAT NEW POLICY WAS PREDICATED ON BALANCE
 OF FORCES IN THE WORLD AND WITHIN VIETNAM: HE ALSO SPOKE OF
 NEED FOR BROADER "COALITION FRONT" WHICH WOULD BACK UP COALITION
 GOVERNMENT.
- ON THE 13TH RESOLUTION, WHICH WAS SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE 12TH RESOLUTION, WHICH WAS SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE 12TH RESOLUTION, APPARENTLY EXPANDED ON THE THEME AND PERMITTED IT TO SEEP DOWN TO LOWER LEVELS, ALTHOUGH COALITION GOVERNMENT COMCEPT



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PAGE FOUR SAIGON SECRET IN 99317

AS SUCH WAS NOT REGULAR FEATURE OF SUCH COURSES. THESE COURSES SUGGESTED THE TEMPORARY ACCEPTANCE OF LESSER GOALS THAN COMPLETE VICTORY AND NOTED THAT AFTER THE GENERAL UPRISING "DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, THE GOVERNMENTAL INFRASTRUCTURE SHOULD BE IN OUR HANDS."

13. THE COMMUNIQUE ON 20 AUGUST 1967 EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESS OF THE NFLSV CALLED FOR A "NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC COALITION GOVERNMENT,"

BUT CURIOUSLY ENOUGH, REFERENCES ON COALITION GOVERNMENT THEN SUBSIDED AT LOWER LEVELS. IN OCTOBER 1967, HOWEVER, RASH OF REFERENCES TO COALITION GOVERNMENT POLICY REAPPEARED IN CONNECTION WITH "HISTORICAL PHASE" OF THE 1967-1968 WINTER. SPRING CAMPAIGN.

14. WITHIN CONCEPT OF THIS CAMPAIGN. VC VIEW COALITION GOVERNMENT AS PRODUCT OF GENERAL UPRISING OF THE PEOPLE OF SVN AGAINST THE PRESENT GUN AND AS MEANS TO SECURE WITHDRAVAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS. ALTHOUGH THERE IS INSÍSTENCE THAT COALITION GOVERNMENT BE CONTROLLED BY THE NFLSV. IT IS ADMITTED THAT COALITION WOULD NOT BE FINAL VICTORY, BUT ONLY STEP FORWARD SINCE "LETHAL BLOW" CANNOT BE DEALT ALLIED FORCES AT THIS TIME. INDEED, VC IN ONE CAPTURED DOCUMENT EXPLAINED THAT COALITION GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT EVEN HAVE TO

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BE HEADED BY FRONT MEMBER. ALBEIT THE DOCUMENT WAS QUICK TO POINT OUT THAT HEAD OF COALITION GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO FOLLOW FRONT'S PROGRAM. MOREOVER, EVEN THOUGH CURRENTLY CONSTITUTED GVN COULD NOT BE INVOLVED IN COALITION GOVERNMENT, SOME INDIVIDUAL ECEMENTS --UNSPECIFIED--NIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE AT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL. APPARENTLY FELT IT HORE IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN CONTROL AT BOTTOM AND IN ARMED FORCES RATHER THAN AT TOP: IN OTHER INDROS. THEY SEEMED TO BE SAYING THAT AS LONG AS THEY HELD REAL LEVERS OF POWER, IT DID NOT MUCH MATTER WHO HAD THE TRAPPINGS OF AUTHORITY. BENEATH CENTRAL LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT, THE UC BERAN TO HEDGE CONCEPT OF COALTTION IN ORDER TO ENHANCE VC POSITION. AT VILLAS LEVEL, MOREOVER, ADMINISTRATION HAD TO BE HELD BY VC. VC CONSIDERED IT ESSENTIAL THEY CONTROL ARMED FORCES. FINALLY AMERICANS WOULD HAVE TO AGREE TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. ALTHOUGH COALITION GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE ESTABLISHED BEFORE ALL AMERICANS LEFT.

COALITION GOVERNMENTS AND REPORTS CONTAIN REFERENCES TO

CDEC LOG NO. 02-1854-67

-- COEC LOG NO. 04-3379-67

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3 AUGUST 1967

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CDEC LOG NO. 12-1995-67 .

CDEC LOG NO. 09-1983-67

CDEC LOG NO. 10-1657-67

CDEC-LOG NO. 11-1239-67

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NEGOTIATIONS

IN DECEMBER 1965, VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS HAVE PAID CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION TO POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS AND CONDITIONS RUR, AND SIGNIFICANCE OF, THEIR BEING HELD. NEGOTIATIONS, OR MORE SPECIFICALLY "NEGOTIATING WHILE FIGHTING," BEGAN TO BE MENTIONED IN CAPTURED VC DOCUMENTS DATED 1966 AND BECAME A RATHER COMMON THEME. IN FIRST SIX MONTHS ON 1967. THEME WAS PUT MOST CLEARLY

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IN SPEECH GIVEN BY NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) GENERAL NGUYEN
VAN VINH, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE NVA, TO MEETING OF
CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM (COSVN) CONBRESS IN APRIL*
1966. VINH STATED THAT "FIGHTING CONTINUES UNTIL THE EMERGENCE
OF A SITUATION WHERE BOTH SIDES ARE FIGHTING INDECISIVELY.
THEN A SITUATION WHERE FIGHTING AND NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONDUCTED
SIMULTANEOUSLY MAY EMERGE." FROM, VINH'S VANTAGE, WAR WOULD
PROCEED THROUGH 1) THE FIGHTING STATE; 2) THE STAGE OF FIGHTING
WHILE NEGOTIATING; AND 3) NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SIGNING OF
AGREEMENTS. AFTER THIS, QUESTION OF WHETHER WAR WOULD RESUME
WOULD DEPEND ON BALANCE OF FORCES; IF COMMUNISTS COULD DOMINATE
SITUATION WITHOUT WAR, THEN THEY WOULD NOT RESORT TO MILITARY
TACTICS ANEW; IF THEY COULD NOT, THEY OBVIOUSLY WOULD RETURN TO.
MILITARY ACTION.

THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS THROUGHOUT 1966. IN 1967, MOREOVER, AN EVEN GREATER EMPHASIS SEEMED TO BE PLACED ON POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS, OR AT LEAST "TALKS." THIS, OF COURSE, WAS MOST APPARENT IN THE INTERVIEW OF NORTH VIETNAM (NVN) FOREIGN MINISTER NGUYEN DUY TRINH WITH AUSTRAILIAN JOURNALIST

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WILFRED BURCHETT IN JANUARY 1967. THIS THEME WAS ALSO STRESSED IN CAPTURED DOCUMENTS THROUGHOUT EARLY SUMMER OF 1967, SOME DOCUMENTS EVEN GOING SO FAR AS TO STATE THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE HELD BEFORE YEAR'S END.

HOWEVER, REFERENCES TO NEGOTIATIONS HAVE PRACTICALLY DISAPPEARED.

FROM CAPTURED DOCUMENTS. AT SAME TIME, NVN LEADERS HAVE REVERTED.

TO HARD LINE. CONCERNING NEGOTIATIONS, AS FOR EXAMPLE IN

NVN PREMIER PHAM VAN DONG'S SPEECH ON 31 AUGUST 1967. IN ANY

EVENT. NEGOTIATIONS ARE INVARIABLY DESCRIBED AS PART OF

CONTINUING STRYGGLE, AND HEAVY STRESS IS LAID UPON NECESSITY

FOR FIGHTING EVEN HARDER WHILE NEGOTIATIONS TAKE PLACE AND

UPON AVOIDANCE OF ANY "ILLUSIONS ABOUT PEACE".

19. FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS CONTAIN BEST INFORMATION CURRENTLY AVAILABLE CONCERNING VIET CONG ATTITUDES TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS:

CDEC LOG NO. 01-3225-67, PP. 15-17

CDEC LOG NO. 02-1846-67, PP. 13-16

'CDEC LOG NO. 01-3398-67, PP. 22-24

CDEC LOG NO. 04-3379-67, P. 14

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